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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pendent contract. The view of the Georgia court was that, while the
traveling employee can be classified as an employee, he must be treated
as such. Thus, as it was stated in the Thornton case, "The scope and
range of a traveling man's territorial activity necessarily broadens the
field of his employment, but in no other way is a traveling eniployee
distinguished under the act from ordinary employees who do not have
to travel in the performance of their work."' 42
In the final analysis the problem may be solved in either of two
ways. The court may set a definite boundary line in each instance over
which no traveling employee may step still clothed in the protective
covering of the act, or the court must resolve that, as a matter of
policy, all traveling employees, and perhaps employees of any nature,
will be compensated for any and all accidental injuries arising in the
course of activities in any way connected or associated with the employ-
ment, throwing the resultant burden on the employer who passes the
increased operating expense on to the consumer of his product or serv-
ices in the form of increased charges. What future courts will choose
to do can only be surmised. It is clear that the present trend of the
Georgia court is toward the former policy.
CHARLES F. CoIRA, JR.
Corporations-Withholding Charter Because No
North Carolina Incorporator
Press reports of January 15 stated that the Secretary of State had
refused "to issue the charter," i.e., to file the certificate of incorporation
of an oil company and certify a copy because no incorporator was a
resident of this state.1 The obstacle was met by adding a North Caro-
lina subscriber, presumably by issuing him one share of stock. The
news story correctly stated that the North Carolina corporation law
does not require any incorporator to be a resident2 but does require one
director to be and provides that all directors must be bona fide stock-
holders.8 As the business of the corporation must be managed by its
directors,a this means that sooner or later there must be a North Caro-
lina stockholder if the law is complied with. Nevertheless a corporation
might be organized sometime in advance of entering upon active busi-
ness4 and there is nothing in the law to prevent it existing for that
period without North Carolina stockholders. After the corporation is
once organized, however, it might merely ignore the legislative direc-
42Ibid.
'Durham Sun (Jan. 15, 1945), P. - , col. - , re: Tidewater Petroleum
and Gas Co.IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §55-2.
'Id. at §55-48. Quaere, what is meant by "bona fide."
a Ibid
' See Hammond v. Williams, 215 N. C. 657, 659, 3 S. E. (2d) 437, 439 (1939).
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tion; and the only relief then would seem to be by quo warranto, 5*
a special proceeding seldom resorted to and the chances are that the
corporation could go ahead for sometime without compliance. 6* The
Secretary of State by his action heads off the possibility of that evasion
7
*
but there seems no warrant for this administrative policing of incorpora-
tion, and it is believed mandamus would lie to compel the issuance of a
charter.s* Here, however, as in so many other cases, compliance was
easier than standing up for probably inconsequential rights and the
administrative action gets no test.
'* That is, a civil action having the essentials of quo warranto. N. C. Gmsa.
STAr. (1943) §55-126. The special proceeding itself is abolished. Id. at §1-514.6
* Though if securities were sold the "blue sky" law, N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
Ch. 78, would call for registration with the Secretary and a disclosure of the
names and addresses of directors. Id. at §78-9 (a).7* Of course, if the resident incorporator is a mere nominee of the others, there
is no assurance that he will be elected director; and the Secretary's effort to en-
force the policy of the law would then be ineffective, perhaps an added reason for
holding his action unwarranted.
8* "When a statement of incorporation which conforms to the provisions of the
general Corporation act is presented to the Secretary of State, he must file it and
must issue a certificate of incorporation to the incorporators; but if the statement
of incorporation presented to him is not in conformity with the act he must refuse
to file it. His duties in this regard are ministerial. The inquiry, then, is whether
the statement presented by the relators set forth the information required by the
act." People ex rel Hardin v. Emmerson, 315 Ill. 241, 243, 146 N. E. 129 (1925).
Certificate issuing officials often have attempted to carry out the policy of a law
by refusing to act when they considered it unwise for some reason. Unless dis-
cretion was vested in them as to the specific matter objected to they have usually
been overruled. Elmer v. Com'r of Ins., 304 Mass. 194, 23 N. E. (2d) 95 (1939)
(Commissioner doubts fitness of incorporators); Manley v. McLendon, 158 Ga.
659, 124 S. E. 138 (1924) (Secretary thinks name suggests State ownership);
State ex rel Security Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Brodigan, 44 Nev. 212, 192 Pac. 263
(1920) (Secretary objects to amended certificate on ground of ultra vires). Con-
trast the situation as to discretion where banking privileges are sought and there
is special legislation. Pue v. Hood, 222 N. C. 310, 22 S. E. (2d) 896 (1942).
And see State ex rel Lucey v. Terry, 196 Atl. 163 (Del. Super. 1937) ; Isle Royale
Land Corp. v. Sec'y of State, 76 Mich. 162, 43 N. W. 14 (1889) (per Campbell,
J., foreign corporation).
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